Northeast Asia’s geopolitical environment is transforming rapidly. While Russia’s war in Ukraine created opportunities for North Korea to re-engage the world, the recent joint declaration by Russia and China signals to global actors that deeper regional cooperation mechanisms are at play. In this evolving geopolitical environment, Mongolia, too, will have options to diversify its partners and expand economic opportunities.
Since the end of World War II, Mongolia has positioned itself as an active player in promoting peaceful dialogues and conflict resolution to global and regional conflicts. Particularly in Northeast Asia’s context, Mongolia has been a voice of diplomacy, and preferenced soft power over hard power when dealing with issues such as the denuclearization of North Korea, the unification of the two Koreas, and building a robust system of regional connectivity.
In Mongolia’s diplomatic efforts and by maintaining strong historical links with both Seoul and Pyongyang, Ulaanbaatar became a vessel for diplomacy and cultural engagement with both countries. Strategically, by strengthening these relationships, Mongolia aims to reduce its landlocked economic vulnerability. Within the emerging geopolitical landscape, Mongolia may have opportunities to diversify its economic partners.
Considering Mongolia and North Korea’s historic diplomatic ties, there are existing cooperation mechanisms and projects at hand. For example, in 2013, during a historic visit of the Mongolian President Elbegdorj Tsakhia to Pyongyang, the two countries signed an economic package which included the utilization of North Korea’s Rajin port. The Rajin Port is located in the Rason Special Economic Zone and serves as a strategic access that could unlock Mongolia’s landlocked position, generating a cold-water maritime outlet. By utilizing the port, Mongolia will be able to diversify its ports and not solely depend on China’s port of Tianjin.
Moreover, Mongolia has the potential to export coal to North Korea. Given the current geopolitical environment where both Russia and China are seeking opportunities with North Korea, Mongolia’s position is equally crucial.
The Rajin port discussion began back in the 1990s, with the backing of the United Nations under the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), and has been an economic pillar between Mongolia and North Korea despite changes of leadership.
During this year’s Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security, which took place on June 5, South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong-young made a special address on the on “The Path to Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula and Common Prosperity in Northeast Asia.” Chung met with Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa and called for Mongolia’s support in advancing peace in the Korean Peninsula.
Moreover, in an effort to include North Korea in the changing geopolitical scene in Northeast Asia, Chung called for Pyongyang’s active participation in the security dialogues and the Tumen River development.
The Tumen River development project, in essence, involves a deeper cooperation of regional actors on the Arctic Sea Route and developing regional connectivity between the proposed Seoul-Beijing high-speed rail link, and the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Trans-China Railway, and the Trans-Mongolian Railway systems.
These initiatives highlight the geopolitical shift in Northeast Asia and the emergence of partnerships that can create new diplomatic channels and economic engagement for regional actors. North Korea, with the support of Russia and China, as well as increasingly Southeast Asian and Eastern European actors, will continue to aim to function as a somewhat normal state despite the protracted discussions on nuclearization and governance.
In addition, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visit to Pyongyang further demonstrates a deepening of regional cooperation and improved mechanisms. In early May, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to China, with the hope of reassuring the rest of the world that Moscow and Beijing’s relations remain strong and will continue to be. The Russia-China Joint Declaration recognized the shifts and transformations in the post-WWII international order and that both Moscow and Beijing will, while adhering to certain principles, seek new partnerships and engage the world.
Aligning with Mongolia’s strategic interest and its efforts in diversifying opportunities with regional connectivity, there is another major project at hand, which involves the Moscow-Ulaanbaatar-Beijing trilateral mechanism.
The Power of Siberia 2 is a major trilateral development that Ulaanbaatar cannot miss and hopes to launch with its only two neighbors. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and China’s hesitancy to finalize the details and the terms of the project, the Power of Siberia 2 has been slow to progress. At the same time, while the implementation of the Power of Siberia 2 is in the interest of Mongolia’s economic and regional connectivity ambitions, with the general outlook for geopolitical instability, Ulaanbaatar, too, may not be keen to rush into major commitments.
From Northeast Asia’s geopolitical point of view, there are notable changes and pending opportunities. Particularly to a landlocked, small economy like Mongolia, strategic stability and diplomatic resilience go hand-in-hand. To Ulaanbaatar’s diplomatic strength, Mongolia maintains its position as a trustworthy partner and actor, but with new opportunities emerging on the horizon, Ulaanbaatar must navigate even more strategically. While both Power of Siberia 2 and the utilization of North Korea’s Rajin port are gateways to Mongolia’s economic goals, these will likely take time and depend on many factors that will not only involve international relations of Russia, China, and North Korea, but also the United States, South Korea, and how the international community views the emerging geopolitical reality.
